

NORTH KOREAN TERRORISM: TRENDS, CHARACTERISTICS,
AND DETERRENCE

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I. INTRODUCTION

Terrorism exercised by North Korea against South Korea aims to disrupt and destroy the South Korean regime; thus, is a form of "political violence" (Shultz; 1986). This terrorism, expressed in a variety of violent acts below the threshold of conventional warfare, is subsumed under the general heading of "unconventional warfare" (Singh 1977). However, North Korea has not consistently resorted to terrorism to express its politically motivated hostility toward South Korea; it also tried the strategy of conventional war as was the case of the Korean War (1950-1953).

The aftermath of the bloody war left the Korean peninsula in ashes and both sides of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) along the 38th parallel had to be almost completely rebuilt again. The prohibitive cost of conventional war forced North Korea to switch from the conventional to nonconventional varieties of political violence against South Korea. As soon as some of the major wounds of the war began to show signs of healing, North Korea started to launch the smaller but more insidious acts of violence including terrorism.

Terrorism is commonly defined as the use of violence and the threats to use violence as a political weapon to achieve control, to influence government policy and/or to destabilize and even overthrow government (Lynch, 1987). In terms of its operation, such acts as bombing, kidnapping, assassination, armed assault, hijacking, and barricade and hostage episodes, counts for ninety-five percent of all terrorist acts (Jenkins, 1982).

North Korean terrorism has found its way to other parts of the world as it became internationalized. North Korea today is a major exporter of terrorism to the Middle East, Central and South America and Southeast Asia. North Korean terrorists have begun to launch terrorist attacks at South Korean people and airplanes beyond the geographical boundary of the Korean peninsula.

This paper attempts to provide an overview of North Korean terrorism—its trends, characteristics, and possible deterrence. Within this framework, it is the writer's contention that North Korean terrorism is the product of an aber-

rant form of socialist ideology cultivated in a highly closed society and has extremely lethal possibilities of a global scale. Possible deterrence ultimately requires a coordinated international policy on anti-terrorism including political and economic sanctions against North Korea.

II. TRENDS IN NORTH KOREAN TERRORISM

North Korea's terrorism against South Korea falls into several stages coinciding with each decade starting in the 1950s. Each decade was marked by different leadership in South Korea except the 1970s, during which the South continued to be led by President Park. Unlike the South, there has been no change of leadership in North Korea for the last four decades. Under the firmly established leadership of Kim Il-sung, North Korea has been extremely sensitive to changes in the power structure in South Korean government, and the strategies and its tactics of terrorism have reflected the changes of leadership in South Korea.

The strategies and tactics employed by political terrorists are often directed at three groups: the populace, the regime in power, and the terrorist regime itself. The overall objectives of these strategies and tactics are to: 1. gain popular support, 2. disrupt and destroy the military and psychological strength of the regime, and 3. achieve internal stability and growth. (Singh, 1977)

The 1950s

The years immediately following the Korean War (1950-1953) did not witness any remarkable acts of political violence against South Korea due to the enormous reconstruction work and costs required by the destruction of war. The first significant act of violence was recorded in 1958 in which five North Korean terrorists hijacked a South Korean commercial airliner with thirty-four passengers aboard. During the same year, another hijacking was attempted on an Air Force carrier but failed.

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Trends in North Korean Terrorism Against South Korea

	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s
Strategy:	Conventional Warfare	Unconventional Warfare	Unconventional Warfare	Unconventional Warfare
Tactic:	Military Intervention. Terrorism: Hijacking	Guerrilla Tactics: Assassination Terrorism: Bombing Assassination Hijacking	Terrorism: Assassination Hijacking Kidnapping	Terrorism: Assassination Bombing
Target:	South Korea	President Park	President Park	President Chun 1988 Olympics,
Objective:	To destroy & disrupt South Korea	To disrupt South Korean Regime	To disrupt South Korean Regime	To disrupt South Korean Regime To disrupt 1988 Olympics

The 1960s

The first half of the 1960s saw repeated bombing of railroad tracks near the Demilitarized Zone, the hijacking of a commercial airliner with fifty passengers aboard, and repeated incidents of hijacking of fishing vessels near the 38th parallel.

One major presidential assassination plot involving thirty-one North Korean armed guerrilla forces known as "Kim Shin Jo Affair", was unfolded in 1968. The thirty-one individuals in five guerrilla squads marched to the presidential residence in Seoul to murder President Park Chung Hee. During the fight with the South Korean armed forces, twenty-eight out of the thirty-one were shot to death; two fled; and only Kim Shin Jo was captured. This incident has been view-

ed as an act of jealousy and nervousness of North Korea over the fast pace of reconstruction which was being carried out in South Korea under the strong leadership of President Park. The “Kim Shin Jo Affair” signified the North Korean regime’s obsession with assassination of the South Korean president, and signaled several more such attempts directed at President Park and his successor, President Chun.

The 1970s

During the decade of 1970s, South Korea was transformed from a poverty-stricken, rural, agricultural nation to an affluent, urban, industrial nation under the strong, authoritarian leadership of President Park. President Park, with his life-term presidency and virtually unlimited power, was able to mobilize South Korea’s human resources for the purpose of rapid industrialization, often referred to as “the miracle of the Han River”. These accomplishments made him a progressively more attractive target of assassination by North Korean terrorists.

In 1970, three terrorists planted remote control bombs at a national cemetery to assassinate the President who was to attend the June 25th Korean War commemoration ceremony. In the process, one agent was killed by an accidental explosion of a bomb and two others fled. In 1974, a solitary North Korean assassin named Moon Sae Kwang traveled through Japan with a forged passport and shot at President Park at the August 15th National Liberation Day ceremony. The bullets missed the President and hit and killed the First Lady Yook.

The so-called “Moon Sae Kwang Affair”, which sought the elimination of the powerful but not-so-popular president of South Korea and the gaining of support from the populace, left tragic and lingering effects on the President and his regime. The immediate effect was the outpouring of sympathy for the deceased First Lady who, unlike her husband, had been well-liked by the people, and for the heart-broken President. The longer-lasting effect was the President’s unmistakable leaning toward much more repressive policies directed at his political foes – not only suspected North Korean agents but also politicians, students, and journalists who opposed his dictatorial leadership. The President,

who became progressively more repressive, alienated, and paranoid, was murdered by the Head of his Central Intelligence Agency in 1979.

In 1978, a famous South Korean actress, Choi Eun Hee and her ex-husband, a movie director were kidnapped to Pyongyang by North Korean agents while visiting Hong Kong. During their eight years of captivity, they were coerced to produce numerous movies. They escaped to the West in 1986 through Australia.

The 1980s

Soon after President Chun Doo Hwan, an ex-Army general, succeeded the later President Park, North Korean terrorists resumed their favorite project of attempting to assassinate the South Korean president. In 1981, a North Korean agent deployed to Canada named Choi Joong Hwa and his associates plotted the assassination of President Chun during the President's state visit to Canada. The plot was uncovered and Choi fled to North Korea.

In October, 1983, while President Chun was paying a state visit to Burma, another assassination plot unfolded in Rangoon, which claimed twenty-one lives including seventeen South Korean government officials and four Burmese. President Chun narrowly escaped the catastrophe. The incident, referred to as "the Rangoon Massacre", was conducted by three North Korean terrorists on foreign soil, signaling the arrival of the new era of "international terrorism".

South Korea continued to prosper economically and diplomatically and enjoyed the honor and the international recognition of having been selected as the site for 1986 Asian Olympics and the 1988 Summer Olympics. North Korea apparently saw the South's selection as a major defeat in the battle for supremacy on the divided Korean peninsula and concentrated its destructive capabilities on wrecking the games. One week before the 1986 Asian Games, a bomb exploded at Kimpo airport killing five people. The identity of the terrorists has not yet been known.

In November 1987, two North Korean terrorists planted a bomb on Korean Air Lines flight bound for Seoul from Burma, killing all 115 passengers aboard.

The terrorists disembarked at the last stopover prior to the explosion. Upon being detained, both terrorists swallowed cyanide pills which killed the male agent and put the female terrorist in critical condition. The surviving terrorist, Kim Hyun Hee, said that she had been trained for missions against the 1988 Seoul Olympics since 1984. The KAL 858 Bombing is the largest scale, most indiscriminate killing of innocent people by North Korean terrorists to date, indicating the escalating lethality of North Korean terrorism.

The forementioned terrorist incidents indicate that North Korea has developed a strong preference of terrorism to other forms of political violence and that it intensifies and expands terrorism as terrorism serves its political goals economically, effectively, conveniently, and surely like no other form of violence can. First, terrorism is easier and less riskier than military intervention or guerilla tactics in view of the difficulty and danger involved in penetrating the North-South Korean border which is heavily guarded by the South Korean and the United States armed forces. Second, terrorism can be exercised without the ready revelation of the identity of the individuals and their supporting state involved. As always, North Korea can point its finger at South Korea to blame "the South Korea's fabricated acts." Third, terrorism is a sure way of creating the image of "the dangerous South Korea," so that people of the world will want to stay away from it, making it impossible for South Korea to host important international conferences and sports games successfully. Fourth, terrorism can add fuel to fire to escalate the current social unrest in South Korea. Terrorists can join the demonstrating students and picketing labor unions encouraging and exaggerating the expression of their dissatisfaction with the South Korean regime.

III. CHARACTERISTICS OF NORTH KOREAN TERRORISM

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in the case of North Korea where political power is concentrated in the hands of a God-like patriarch, Kim Il-sung and his son, Kim Jong-il. Kim Il-sung, the patriarch, often referred to as “the great leader” by the North Korean people, created an unorthodox breed of Marxism-Leninism called “Juche ideology”, which guarantees his central position in every politically motivated behavior of the North Korean people, including terrorism against South Korea.

The organizational and the structural aspects of North Korea’s forces, specially trained for various forms of political violence, involve two governmental units: the Research Department of the Korean Workers’ Party and the VIII Special Purpose Corps. These units train and dispatch agents to South Korea and the beyond to operationalize “Juche ideology.”

“Juche Ideology”

“Juche” means self-reliance. As a socialist ideology, Juche is based on Marxism and Leninism. Kim Il-sung, the North Korean president for the past forty years, used the term “Juche” officially in 1955 for the first time (Gorden, 1975). Emphasizing the importance of the resolution of North Korea’s problems by herself, Kim declared that neither the Russian nor Chinese experience should be emulated wholesale, but it should be flexibly applied to suit the particular situation in North Korea so as to carry out the Korean solution correctly (Kim, 1960). Juche ideology was adopted as the guiding principle of the Korean Workers’ Party in 1961 (Chong, 1987).

Juche ideology differs from Marxism and Leninism in two important points. First, Marxism holds that history does not make man as man desires: man creates history but within defined limitations (Tucker, 1972) Juche ideology holds that man is the creator, and history is solely determined by man’s ideological consciousness (Chong, 1987). Second, Lenin preferred the Communist Party as an appropriate mechanism of revolution whereas Juche ideology prefers an enlightened hero as the center of revolutionary movement.

Juche ideology is a Koreanized Marxism just as Maoism during the early

part of 1940s was a Chinasized Marxism. Juche ideology departs from Maoism on the role of the leader in the socialist revolution. Maoism denies any important role for an enlightened leader in hastening the revolutionary process and generally holds a disdainful view of intellectuals. Juche ideology, on the contrary, idolizes the leader as the brain of the people, the heart of the people, and the center of popular integration, offering the people ideas, strategies and tactics (Chong, 1987).

The conception of man as the lord of creation, man worship, and absolute trust in the leader's knowledge, patriotism and ability to bring people together inherent in Juche ideology are the important factors which contribute significantly to the behavioral characteristics of North Korean terrorists.

Organization of the North Korean Terrorists

According to Bermudez (1988), there are approximately 16,800 personnel belonging to the Korean Workers' Army's (KWA) VIII Special Purpose Corps. They are organized into four reconnaissance brigades, specially trained, strictly disciplined, and equipped to participate in direct actions such as assassination or abduction of enemy personnel, or indirect tactics such as creating panic and confusion in the rear.

The chain of command for the reconnaissance brigades extends from the Ministry of People's Armed Forces, through the General Staff Department's Reconnaissance Bureau and VIII Special Purpose Corps to the individual reconnaissance brigades. Each brigade has approximately 4,200 personnel and the basic unit of operation is the reconnaissance squad of ten men which usually subdivides into smaller teams of two to six persons while engaged in special operations (Bermudez 1988). The 1983 Rangoon massacre was the act of three members of the reconnaissance brigade of the VIII Special Purpose Corps.

According to the Casua Journal (1988), the selection criteria for a recruit into the VIII Special Purpose Corps include: 1. a physically healthy young man who has not been exposed to any political ideology other than Juche ideology

of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il; 2. a person of non-Japanese origin either by birth or ethnicity; 3. a person of sound ideological foundation; 4. a person who does not have blood-relatives in South Korea; 5. a person of excellent fighting capabilities in air force, transportation, communication or reconnaissance operations.

Special operations conducted by the members of the reconnaissance brigades are almost always conducted with support of the agents from the Research Department of the Korean Workers' Party or the Political Security Department. However, as was the case in the 1987 bombing of the KAL 858, the Research Department sometimes conducts its own operations utilizing its own human resources.

From the fact that Kim Il-sung has the decisive voice on policy matters concerning the Ministry of People's Armed Forces and that his son Kim Jong-il, Secretary of the Korean Worker's Party (KWP) has control over the KWP's Research Department, it can be logically concluded that the senior and junior Kim have the organizational mechanism through which they may implement any plans of political violence as their ideology or whim guides them.

North Korea's International Terrorism

North Korea currently is a major exporter of terrorism. Since the late 1960s, over 5000 foreign terrorists including 1,350 from Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), were trained in North Korea in bombing, urban or rural guerrilla warfare, VIP kidnap and assassination and psychological warfare. Also, North Korea sends its military advisory missions, composed of reconnaissance brigade personnel, to Central and South America, Southeast Asia and Africa to train local terrorists gearing to their particular social and environmental circumstances. In over thirty-four countries, over 2000 terrorists have been produced in this manner.

North Korea has been providing a safe haven for the members of Japanese Red Army who hijacked the Japan Air Liner "Yo Do Ho" to Pyongyang in 1970.

However, since 1987, members of the Japanese Red Army have been moving in and out of North Korea creating the suspicion of their preparation for disrupting the 1988 Seoul Olympics. One member was arrested in Japan carrying a false passport and a ticket for Seoul. Another suspected member was arrested by Philippine authorities at a hospital where he was undergoing plastic surgery to disguise his identity, allegedly in preparation for terrorist acts at the Seoul Olympics.

Major Characteristics of North Korean Terrorism

A major problem in identifying any common characteristics among terrorists is that there are many types of terrorist activities performed by many different individuals in varied operational circumstances (Astron, 1986). The large number of variables-differing reasons, motivations, ideologies, training techniques, and expertise-only magnifies the problem and makes it nearly impossible to isolate essential psychological characteristics. It is difficult to tell whether terrorist activity primarily represents an extension of personality or an extension of ideology (Miller, 1988).

Horowitz (1973) hypothesized the following useful hypotheses concerning the psychological profile of the terrorists:

1. A terrorist is a person engaged in politics who makes little, if any, distinction between strategy and tactics on the one hand and principles on the other.
2. A terrorist is prepared to surrender his own life for a considered transcendent in value.
3. A terrorist is a person who possesses both a self-fulfilling prophetic element and a self-destructive element.
4. A terrorist is a person for whom all events are volitional and none are determined.
5. A terrorist is young, most often from a middle-class family background, usually male, and economically marginal.

6. A terrorist performs his duties as an avocation.
7. The terrorist distinguishes himself from the causal homicide in several crucial respects: he murders systematically rather than at random; he is symbolic rather than passionate (that is, he is concerned with scoring political points rather than responding to personal provocation); his actions are usually well planned rather than spontaneous.
8. The terrorist by definition does not distinguish between coercion and terrorism because he lacks access to the coercive mechanisms of the state.
9. A terrorist, through the act of violence, advertises and dramatizes a wider discontent.
10. A terrorist believes that the act of violence will encourage the uncommitted public to withdraw support from the regime, and hence make wider revolutionary acts possible by weakening the resolve of the opposition.
11. A terrorist may direct his activities against the leadership of the opposition by assassinating presidents and political leaders. Such terrorist usually tends to function alone in the service of an often poorly defined ideology rather than within a political movement.
12. A terrorist does not have a particularly well-defined ideological persuasion.

In view of the total absence of clinical and/or empirical studies on the psychological profile of North Korean terrorists, and in recognition of the idiosyncratic political, social, and psychological variables which are bound to have significant impacts on the personality characteristics of the North Korean people, the following hypotheses concerning North Korean terrorists have been constructed, based point by point upon Horowitz's hypotheses.

1. A North Korean terrorist is a person engaged in politics peripherally. He is expected to relinquish his freedom of independent thinking to the Korean Workers' Party or the Korean People's Army to which he belongs on such subjects as whether or not a given strategy and/or tactic is consistent with the

guiding principle of “Juche ideology.” Theoretically, the guiding principle can be interpreted only by Kim Il-sung, and his interpretation comes down through the hierarchy of the Party to each individual.

2. A North Korean terrorist is prepared to surrender his own life for the noble cause of liberating South Korea and other nations which are in a similar political situation (that is, which are perceived as colonies of the United States) from “the American imperialism”. This cause transcends all other causes in value as declared by “Juche ideology”.

3. A North Korean terrorist, while he does not offer evidences of possessing a self-fulfilling prophetic element as Horowitz has suggested, certainly demonstrates a self-destructive tendency. If he has a prophetic element, it must be the prophecy of the victory of socialism and Juche ideology. However, this prophecy has not been fulfilled and shows few signs of being fulfilled. A North Korean terrorist shows a strong propensity toward self-destruction when faced with an imminent capture and interrogation. The terrorists involved in the 1983 Rangoon massacre attempted to blow themselves up to avoid capture. In the process, one terrorist lost an eye and one arm; another seriously wounded himself. The terrorists in the KAL 858 bombing swallowed cyanide capsules, which killed one and put another in critical condition. It has been known that North Korean terrorists receive instructions and means to kill themselves when and if they fail on a given assignment.

4. A North Korean terrorists is an atheist who denounces religion calling it an equivalent of opium. He has been indoctrinated in Juche ideology which holds the view of man as the lord of creation. He believes that man can recreate man, reform society, and change nature. In his mind, history is made by man, have nothing to do with divine will or any pretermind plan.

5. A North Korean terrorist is often a young man. However, as seen in the KAL 858 case in which a 70-year-old man and a 26-year-old woman disguised as an invalid father and his daughter planted a bomb in the plane, older persons may be recruited for particular assignments.

Although terrorist activities are often carried out by male members, it has

been reported (Bermudez, 1988). That an unknown number of female personnel, either organic to the VIII Special Purpose Corps or from the KWP Research Department or the Political Security Department, may join to support their activities. In the Rangoon massacre, a female suspected to be KWP Research Department agent guided the terrorists to a safe house. In the KAL 858 case, the female terrorist was a member of the KWP Research Department.

The family background of individual terrorists is not known in most of the cases. However, it has been reported that approximately ninety percent of the recruits in the VIII Special Purpose Corps are the highly regarded, well-paid, elite members of the Armed Forces (Casua Journal, 1988).

6. A North Korean terrorist performs his duties as a vocation, not avocation. He lives on it and for it.

7. A North Korean terrorist has been indoctrinated concerning his glorious role in the struggle to liberate South Korea from American colonialism. He believes that he is a liberator and freedom fighter, not a criminal murderer.

He murders systematically according to the instruction handed to him. Even when a murder appears to be senseless and at random, as it did in the case of KAL 858 in which 115 innocent people were killed by a midair explosion of the airliner, it was a calculated act aimed at disrupting the 1988 Olympics. A North Korean terrorist is an agent of politically motivated violence sponsored by his State, not a person out to take revenge on his personal enemies. His duty is to carry out his assignment as planned with little deviation.

8. A North Korean terrorist has no legitimate authority to force his victims to do things against their will, and this leaves him no other option but using terrorist tactics to manipulate their behavior if he is to achieve the goal set out for him.

9. A North Korean terrorist, through radical students and members of extreme groups in South Korea, advertizes and dramatizes the discontent of a certain segment of the South Korean people with the incumbent regime.

10. A North Korean terrorist believes that increasing social unrest caused by violent demonstrations by radical students and members of extreme groups

will alienate the seemingly incompetent regime from the populace, especially the uncommitted element. Hence, to hasten the fall of the incumbent regime, he would do things to add fuel to fire.

11. Assassination of South Korean presidents has been the favorite project for North Korean terrorists for the past three decades. Considering that South Korea has been controlled by strong dictatorial leadership, the anticipated blow to the power structure of South Korea by assassination of these leaders is readily calculated.

Assassination attempts have been made by a large of guerrilla force (1968), a solitary terrorist (1974), as well as a small group of terrorists (1983). Regardless of the number of terrorist involved in the assassination attempts, the would-be assassins appeared to have been well-indoctrinated in Juche ideology.

12. A North Korean terrorist appears to have a well-defined and coherent ideology at the time of his act of violence, no matter how valid it may be. He is so brain-washed and programmed that he is much like a human robot who will carry out any lethal act of violence at the drop of a hat.

One remarkable observation has been that this terrorist shows a considerable degree of deprogrammability as he is exposed to the reality of South Korean existence. Almost a spontaneous recovery from what appears like a hypnotic state occurred in the case of Kim Hyun Hee, the female terrorist in the KAL 858 bombing.

V. POSSIBLE DETERRENCE

Apart from the on-going concern with North Korean terrorism, South Korea is faced with an extraordinary emergency situation at the 1988 Seoul Olympics. The memories of Munich in 1972, when a Palestinian suicide squad murdered eleven Israeli athletes at the Summer Olympics in West Germany still hang heavily over the Seoul Olympics; South Korea is charged with the major responsibility of providing a safe environment for the international athletes from 161

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countries and spectators from all over the world.

In view of North Korean's aggressive gestures toward Korea, including its redeployment of MIG-29s and SA-5 surface-to-air missiles closer to the 38th parallel, the prospect of security at the 1988 Summer Olympics is too fragile for comfort. The 200-mile-range missiles are capable of hitting any aircraft over Seoul airspace.

South Korea's National Policies on Terrorism

The emergency preparations for possible terrorist attacks at the 1988 Summer Olympics including bolstering patrols at airports, tightening the screening of passengers, installing better detectors of explosives, providing on-board protection of the airplane in flight, fortifying security forces with increased number of personnel and sophisticated security equipment, and keeping its military forces on alert. To prepare for the worst, the 42,000 American troops in South Korea are to be placed on alert, and a squadron of 24 F-18 fighters is being moved from Japan to Korea. Also, at least one carrier task force, probably headed by the USS Midway is expected to patrol offshore waters. This preparation is much like that for a full-scale war (Byrd, 1988).

Apart from these emergency measures, south Korea needs to establish a coherent, non-partisan policy distinguishing individual terrorists from the regime that supports the terrorists. The policy must be consistently applied for each and every incident of terrorism. While the policy condemning North Korea for producing a massive number of terrorists to attack South Korea appears to have been consistent within the frame of the anti-socialism/communism doctrine, the policy concerning the treatment of individual terrorists has been quite inconsistent. For example, Moon Sae Kwang, the terrorist who killed two people in his unsuccessful assassination attempt at President Park, received capital punishment, whereas Kim Hun Hee, who killed 115 people in an airplane bombing, has been spared any measure of punishment.

Currently, some members of the minority parties seem more interested in

prosecuting police officers of the Fifth Republic (1981-1988) who have been accused of brutal treatment of political opponents than in matters concerning North Korean terrorists and their sympathizers. The Korean government needs to establish firm policies on various acts of political violence that are committed by members of extreme groups. These acts, resembling those of typical terrorists can become one of the most sinister elements in disrupting the fabric of civilized order in an open society such as South Korea today. As Alexander warned (1986), spectacular acts of terror are often planned and executed by various groups that create to want to save.

South Korea may actively pursue, with the cooperation of the North Korean government, an open corridor policy with North Korea which will permit people divided two halves of the Korean peninsula to travel freely over the 38th parallel and to exchange students, scholars, and journalists for better understanding of each other's life circumstances. The mood for openness is ripe in South Korea, especially among the student population. If North Korea can reciprocate, an increased openness can be achieved. The misconception of South Korea held by the North Korean terrorists, coming, as they do, from a highly closed society, will be considerably modified.

In the past, the Korean government's anti-terrorism policy was reactive and defensive rather than active and offensive. Remedial activities were undertaken only in response to the aftermath of devastating terrorist attacks. However, the current preparation for the 1988 Summer Olympics seems to have changed the anti-terrorism policy toward a more active and progressive one. One good example is South Korea's active intelligence gathering and sharing with her allies the information on potential terrorists and groups, which could help prevent acts of political violence from materializing. Another example is her training of elite commandos with special knowledge and skills on anti-terrorist activities to heighten South Korea's preparedness for anticipated terrorist attacks.

International Cooperation on Anti-terrorism

According to Byrd (1988), one positive sign with respect to international cooperation and coordinated operations to counter terrorism at the 1988 Summer Olympics emerged in June, 1988, when the U.S. Secretary of State Shultz reported that he had received assurances from Soviet leaders that they feel certain there will not be any terrorist acts by its North Korean ally. It appears that some private understandings between the superpowers had been attained. Also, the fact that the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, the two major allies of North Korea, are to send their athletes to Seoul for the Olympics, are seen as a practical deterrence to North Korean terrorism.

However, in due concern with security of the international athletes and visitors, the United States and seven other nations, representing transportation hubs through which most of these people will travel, have made plans to try to ensure that terrorists do not board or hide explosives on planes bound for Seoul. Western and Japanese intelligence agencies have conducted a worldwide watch on terrorists to foretell any threats. Information on hundreds of terrorist groups has been compiled to stop suspects entering South Korea.

Admittedly, the above measures are special emergency measures, patchworks for a special event highly vulnerable to possible terrorist attacks, not a comprehensive policy applicable to other situations in other places at other times. International cooperation on anti-terrorism policies will have to be reached to stamp out the menacing problem of terrorism from South Korea and other nations which are in a similar predicament.

However, as Netanyahu (1986) noted that while all governments uniformly offer rhetorical opposition to terrorism, including the adoption of a United Nations resolution condemning terrorism in 1986, in practice they fall into one of the three categories: A few governments actually oppose terrorism, and do so consistently; others actively support terrorists; but most fall into a third category, neutrals. They are either acquiesce in terrorism or refuse outright to oppose it.

Taken the above phenomenon into consideration, Rabin (1986) proposed that nations concerned with the problem of international terrorism create a special international organization for anti-terrorism so as to make the terrorist countries understand that they will face an organized, united front of nations, ready to take measures that an attacked country would not be able to take along.

Toward the ultimate solution of the South Korean situation with respect to its chronic as well as acute terrorism problems, a special international organization such as the one proposed by Rabin can offer the following two measures of deterrence: 1. political sanction and 2. economic sanction against North Korea for its terrorist acts.

Political Sanction

Political sanction against North Korea by means of international condemnation has already been imposed as she has been condemned as a "terrorist country" along with Cuba, Nigargua, Libya, Iran, South Yeman, and Syria (Reagan, 1985). A more effective political sanction involving shutting down of embassies and deporting diplomats has also been applied to North Korea by Urguey (1966), Sri Lanka (1971), and Chili (1973) for Subversive activities against these incumbent foreign regimes. In Egypt (1975) and Costa Rica (1975), North Korean diplomats were deported on similar charges.

The important role of embassies and the abuse of diplomatic immunities and privileges in promoting international terrorism cannot be underestimated. In fact, foreign embassies have been the sanctuary of the North Korean terrorists, providing them with funds, passports, weapons and intelligence without which they cannot function. This is precisely why it is so important for the special international organization must consider imposing political sanctions against North Korea.

Economic Sanction

Up until the end of the 1970, North Korea grouped to sustain its economy without the benefit of active foreign trade with Western countries. However, it has reached the point where the limited economic aid from Soviet Union alone cannot revive its ailing economy. Since the mid-1980s, North Korea has been employing a policy of expanding trade with virtually any and all states, and has enacted a joint venture law (Koh, 1988). North Korea has increasingly sought contacts with the outside world. So far, the results of the open-door policy have been meager. North Korea desperately needs certain sophisticated products as well as the enormous purchasing power that only the Western countries can provide. If these countries impose a boycott and embargo on North Korea on the ground of its terrorism, it will make North Korea rethink its terrorism policy.

However, in applying pressure on Western countries for such economic sanctions against North Korea, South Korea is in a highly uncomfortable position. Korea has \$3 billion of construction contracts in Libya (Lynch, 1987), the nation condemned by the United States as a terrorist country. Also, South Korea has a similar connection with Iran, another terrorist country. While conducting this type of economic diplomacy, South Korea's appeal to her allies for economic sanction against North Korea cannot be seriously considered. South Korea's commitment and ability to act in concert with her allies in anti-terrorism policies are paramount.

VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

For the past three decades, South Korea has been subjected to various forms of political violence by North Korea from a conventional war to non-conventional warfare including guerrilla tactics and terrorism. An analysis of the trends of North Korean terrorism points to the direction of increasing lethality

and internationalization.

A hypothetical profile of a North Korean terrorist drawn from the knowledge of North Korea's highly unorthodox form of socialistic political ideology, "Juche", its 40-year-old tradition of idolizing "the great leader", and the hermit-like closedness of the State from the rest of the world, as well as some sketchy psychological profiles of North Korean terrorists currently available indicates the following: 1. A North Korean terrorism is an agent indoctrinated in a peculiar breed of political ideology which demands unquestioning dedication and single-minded devotion to its creator; 2. He is prepared to surrender his life for the cause of liberating South Korea from "American imperialism"; 3. He evidences a high propensity toward self-destruction; 4. He is an atheist who does not believe in any element of determinism. His living God is his political and ideological leader; 5. He comes from a special unit of the North Korean Armed Forces or an elite department of the Korean Workers' Party; 6. He is a professional terrorist who lives on it and for it; 7. He perceives himself as a liberator; 8. He uses terrorist tactics to achieve his goals; 9. He advertises and dramatizes the discontent of a certain segment of the South Korean people through radical students and members of extreme groups; 10. He would add fuel to fire to escalate social unrest in South Korea; 11. He is often involved in assassination plots against South Korean presidents, acting solitarily or in groups of varying sizes; 12. He appears to have a well-defined ideology in which he has been thoroughly drilled. However, once exposed to reality as is in South Korea, a spontaneous recovery from his previous state of mind with respect to the political ideology seems possible.

Possible deterrence of North Korean terrorism involves both national and international efforts. While some useful and effective patchwork can be applied for a special situation such as the 1988 Summer Olympics, which holds a high probability of terrorist attacks, the ultimate solution may rest in international cooperation on anti-terrorism policies, such as the imposition of political and economic sanctions against North Korea on the ground of terrorism. The commitment and ability to act in concert by concerned nations on this international

effort is paramount.

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ABSTRACT

For the past three decades, South Korea has been subjected to various forms of political violence by North Korea from a conventional war to nonconventional warfare including guerrilla tactics and terrorism. An analysis of the trends of North Korea terrorism points to the direction of increasing lethality and internationalization.

A hypothetical profile of a North Korean terrorist drawn from the knowledge of North Korea's highly unorthodox form of socialistic political ideology, "Juche", its 40-year-old tradition of idolizing "the great leader", and the hermit-like closedness of the State from the rest of the world, as well as some sketchy psychological profiles of North Korean terrorists currently available indicates the following: 1. A North Korean terrorist is an agent indoctrinated in a peculiar breed of political ideology which demands unquestioning dedication and single-minded devotion to its creator; 2. He is prepared to surrender his life for the cause of liberating South Korea from "American imperialism;" 3. He evidences a high propensity toward self-destruction; 4. He is an atheist who does not believe in any element of determinism. His living God is his political and ideological leader; 5. He comes from a special unit of the North Korean Armed Forces or an elite department of the Korean Worker's Party; 6. He is a professional terrorist who lives on it and for it; 7. He perceives himself as a liberator; 8. He uses terrorist tactics to achieve his goals; 9. He advertises and dramatizes the discontent of a certain segment of the South Korean people through radical students and members of extreme groups; 10. He would add fuel to fire to escalate social unrest in South Korea; 11. He is often involved in assassination plots against South Korean presidents, acting solitarily or in groups of varying sizes; 12. He appears to have a well-defined ideology in which he has been thoroughly drilled. However, once exposed to reality as is in South Korea, a spontaneous recovery from his previous state of mind with respect to the political ideology seems possible.

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北韓의 테러리즘 - 傾向, 特性, 그리고 沮止方法

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要 約

北韓의 對 南韓 테러리즘은 南韓政府를 攪亂시키거나 파괴시키는 것을 目的으로 하고 있는 이른바 政治的인 暴力의 한가지 方法이다. 政治的인 暴力은 正規戰과 非正規戰으로 區分할 수 있는데 테러리즘은 後者에 屬한다. 北韓의 對南韓 政治暴力은 1950年初 韓國戰爭이 아무 勝算없이 韓半島 全域을 잿더미로 만들어 놓고 말았음을 계기로 正規戰으로부터 非正規戰으로 方向을 바꾸었다. 지난 30年間의 北韓테러리즘의 趨勢를 分析한 結果 北韓이 最近에 들어 더욱더 테러리즘 위주의 政治暴力을 가중시키고 있음과, 그 테러方法이 더욱더 極惡無道해지고 있음과, 테러행위의 規模가 國際化되고 있음이 드러났다.

國際테러리스트들의 性格糾明은 그들이 世界各地에서 여러가지로 다른 狀況아래서 갖가지 方法의 테러行爲를 恣行해 왔음으로 인하여 그들만의 특이한 性格上의 共通點을 찾기는 심히 어려우며 現 時點에서는 그들의 테러行爲가 그들 특이의 性格의 反映인지 그들이 追從하는 어떤 특이한 政治理念의 反映인지조차 糾明하기 어렵다는 것이 學界의 衆論이다. 北韓테러리스트의 性格分析은 臨床研究와 統計研究가 모두 되어 있지 않으므로 더욱더 많은 苦衷點을 內包하고 있다. 그러나 그들이 지난 40여年間 거의 完全히 閉鎖된 社會에서, 그들이 偉大한 指導者로 일컫는 김일성과 그가 創造한 所爲 主體理念을 盲從盲信하여 왔음과, 그리고 最近들어 차츰 알려지기 始作한 몇몇 테러리스트들의 性格描寫를 바탕으로 다음과 같은 性格 假定이 提示되었다.

1. 北韓테러리스트는 特異한 政治理念과 그 理念의 創造者에게 無條件의 服從과 盲信을 하도록 洗腦된 者로서,
2. 그는 그 政治理念의 目標인 南韓을 美帝國主義로부터 解放시키는 作業을 위해서는 언제라도 生命을 바칠 準備가 되어 있고,
3. 有事時에는 自暴할 姿勢이며,

4. 無信論者로서, 살아있는 神으로 섬기는 그의 偉大한 指導者以外에는 아무 다른 信仰이 없으며,
 5. 人民軍所屬 特殊軍團에 屬하거나, 北韓勞動黨內 調查部の 要員이며,
 6. 그는 專門인 테러리스트로서 테러行爲가 그의 職責이며,
 7. 自己自身을 解放戰線의 役軍으로 看做하며,
 8. 테러活動을 政治目的의 達成을 위한 手段으로 使用하며,
 9. 南韓內에서 一部極烈學生과 過激한 그룹에 便乘하여 現政權에 不滿을 품고 있는 一部사람들의 反政府 感情을 부추기며,
 10. 社會의 混亂을 助長하기 위하여 불에 기름을 끼얹는 行動을 恣行하며,
 11. 혼자서 혹은 크고 작은 그룹에 끼어 南韓大統領 暗殺을 劃策하며,
 12. 테러活動恣行當時에는 主體理念에 相當히 通達한 듯이 보인다.
- 그러나, 일단 南韓의 實情을 直視할 時間과 機會가 주어지면, 洗腦된 狀態에서의 번복이 可能하다.

北韓테러리즘의 沮止方法은 南韓自體의 힘으로 할 수 있는 比較的 局部的인 方法 卽 1988 서울올림픽에서의 北韓테러活動을 對備하기 위한 空港 및 航空機의 安全을 위한 團束, 爆發物檢擧의 徹底性 強調, 特攻隊 養成, 情報蒐集의 強化 등이 있겠으나 폭넓고 永續性있는 政策樹立이 要求된다. 卽 南韓은 現 시점에서 與野가 悤心하여 反테러리즘政策을 樹立하되 테러리즘을 助長 強行하는 北韓과 그에 隸屬되어 테러行爲를 저지르는 北韓테러리스트를 구별하는 政策을 樹立하여야 하며, 北韓에서 派遣되지는 않았으나 北韓테러리스트의 行動과 類似한 테러活動을 하는 南韓內의 極烈分子에 대한 措置도 이에 包含시켜야 하며, 北韓테러리스트의 南韓에 대한 왜곡된 認識을 止揚하기 위하여 南北韓의 文流를 積極 推進하여야 하며, 過去의 消極的이고 防禦的인 姿勢로부터 벗어나 보다 積極的이고 進取的인 方向으로 發展해 나가야 한다.

南韓에서 北韓테러리즘을 沮止시키는 窮極的인 方法은 南韓과 類似한 形便에 놓여 있고 反테러리즘에 徹底한 友邦國家와의 結束된 國際協同에 있다. 이러한 國際協同은 現 國際形便으로 보아 U.N.내에서는 不可能하며 美國을 爲始한 西方國家와 日本을 中心으로 이루어 질 수 있는 可能性이 보인다. 南韓이 이러한 國際協同機構에 要求할 수 있는 反北韓테러리즘 方法은 그들이 北韓에 대하여 政治的으로 그리

고 經濟的으로 文流를 끊는 일이다. 물론 이러한 要求를 할 수 있기 위해서는 南韓 自體가 이러한 汎國家的인 行動에 始終一貫 行動을 가지런히 할 수 있는 姿勞와 能力을 보여야 할 것이다.